Experience over the past 20 years has shown that, even assuming perfect cryptography, the design of security protocols (or cryptographic protocols, as they are sometimes called) is highly error-prone and that conventional validation techniques based on informal arguments or testing are not up to the task. It is now widely recognized that only formal analysis can provide the level of assurance required by both the developers and the users of the protocols.
verification difficult, compared with other protocols, the authors' effort has yielded significant insights.
In the paper Formal Analysis of MultiParty Contract Signing Chadha, Kremer, and Scedrov analyze the multiparty contract-signing protocols of Garay and MacKenzie (GM) and of Baum and Waidner (BW). They use a finite-state tool, MOCHA, that allows for the specification of protocol properties in a branching-time temporal logic with a game semantics. While their analysis does not reveal any errors in the BW protocol, in the GM protocol they discover serious problems with fairness for four signers and an oversight regarding abusefreeness for three signers. They thus propose a complete revision of the GM subprotocols in order to restore fairness.
In the paper Decision Procedures for the Security of Protocols with Probabilistic Encryption against Offline Dictionary Attacks, Delaune and Jacquemard consider the problem of automatic protocol verification when some data, such as poorly chosen passwords, can be guessed by dictionary attacks. They propose an inference system that extends a set of DolevYYao intruder deduction rules with the introduction of a probabilistic encryption operator and guessing abilities for the intruder. They show that the intruder deduction problem in this extended model is decidable in PTIME. This result yields an NP decision procedure for the protocol insecurity problem in the presence of a passive intruder, while the same problem is proved to be NP-complete in the active case.
In the paper Decidability Issues for Extended Ping-Pong Protocols, Hüttel and Srba use techniques from process algebra to investigate the class of pingpong protocols introduced by Dolev and Yao. They show that all nontrivial properties, including reachability and equivalence checking with respect to the entire van Glabbeek's spectrum, become undecidable for a very simple recursive extension of the protocol. The result holds even if a nondeterministic choice operator is not allowed, but reachability is shown to be decidable in polynomial time if only two parties are participating in the protocol. They also show that the calculus is capable of an implicit description of the active intruder, including full analysis and synthesis of messages in the sense of Amadio, Lugiez, and Vanackère. Further, they show that reachability analysis for a replicative protocol variant is decidable.
The starting point of the paper Attacking Group Protocols by Refuting Incorrect Inductive Conjectures, by Steel and Bundy, is the observation that automated tools for finding attacks on flawed security protocols often fail to deal adequately with group protocols. The reason is that the abstractions made to improve performance on fixed two-or three-party protocols either preclude the modeling of group protocols or permit modeling only in a fixed scenario, which can prevent attacks from being discovered. Their paper describes CORAL, a tool for finding counterexamples to incorrect inductive conjectures, which they have used to model protocols for both group key agreement and group key management, without any restrictions on the scenario. They used CORAL to discover six previously unknown attacks on three group protocols.
